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Trade unions in the “South”
in the era of globalization
Joseph Ramos
This article examines the effects of globalization on the trade union 
movement in developing countries (the “South”). It concludes, first, that 
globalization has been asymmetrical: much further-reaching for trade 
in goods than for capital flows, weak for technology transfer and very 
limited in migratory flows. Second, it examines the role and economic 
repercussions of labour unions. It finds that, contrary to the orthodox 
view, these have little negative impact on employment but do significantly 
reduce wage inequalities. In view of the shift in the South since the 1980s 
away from development strategies based on import substitution aimed at 
domestic markets and towards export-oriented strategies, the final section 
proposes new tasks and priorities for unions that are more consistent with 
this strategic reorientation, both at the national and international levels 
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Trade unionism, as traditionally understood, probably 
peaked as a major force in the economy shortly after 
the Second World War. Unions then accounted for a 
large proportion of the workforce, had considerable 
negotiating power and were highly influential in 
national politics. For different reasons, their power 
began to diminish. Their influence may be under 
even greater threat in today’s world, characterized 
by “globalization” in which economic decision-
making is increasingly shifting from the national to 
the international sphere.
The aim of  this article is to examine the 
implications of globalization for trade unions, and 
most especially for those in the countries of the Third 
World (the “South”). What threats are looming? What 
opportunities, if any, are emerging? What adjustments 
will unions have to make in the way they operate if  
they wish to continue being important actors in their 
own countries and internationally?
This article will not scrutinize the merits or 
otherwise of globalization but will set out from the 
premise that this is, broadly speaking, here to stay 
and if  anything is likely to advance further. What 
will be considered, rather, is how the trade union 
movement can modify those trends in globalization 
that most seem to threaten its interests, or accelerate 
those that are potentially most favourable to it. The 
view taken is that trade unionism is a vital institution 
in society, whose future depends to a great degree 
on its continuing to be able to successfully represent 
workers’ interests, but in a way that is attuned to the 
future needs of our society.
Following this Introduction, the second section 
will examine globalization and the debates surrounding 
it, and will highlight five key facts characterizing it. 
The third section will analyse the traditional roles of 
trade unions and the way these have been evolving, 
the perception of  globalization among workers, 
and international trends (generally declining) in 
unionization and their effects. The fourth and last 
section will consider the impact of  globalization 
on unions in developing countries (the “South”), 
especially Latin America, and will try to elucidate 
the implications of globalization for the trade union 
movement, with a view to its continuing to be an 




The trend towards globalization
1. What is meant by globalization?
Globalization has been succinctly defined as “competing 
with everyone from everywhere for everything”. 
More formally, globalization can be described as 
the process whereby a country’s production comes 
to depends less on its own economic policies and 
local conditions as its production system becomes 
increasingly open to, and dependent upon, factors 
external to it: capital flows, labour (migration) and 
technology which, along with rising trade in goods and 
services, determine what is produced and consumed 
and what is imported and exported.
2. The debate1
The main debate about the tendency towards 
globalization turns on whether it is a good or 
bad thing. One criticism is that it forces countries 
to “compete downward”, i.e., that the need to 
compete internationally obliges countries to lower 
their national standards to the lowest standards 
1  A good introduction to the globalization debate can be found in 
Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2000). Gray (1998) and Stiglitz (2003) 
provide some of the sharpest, although still measured, criticism. 
Bhagwati (2004) offers a staunch defence of globalization.
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prevailing in the world. The result is competition to 
cut wages (or at least not raise them), reduce labour 
and environmental standards and tax firms less. This 
economic criticism is accompanied by a cultural 
one to the effect that globalization threatens to put 
an end to each nation’s idiosyncrasies, resulting in 
the predominant culture, that of  the United States, 
prevailing over local cultures. This is what is called 
the “McDonaldization” of  the world.
The defenders of globalization, on the other hand, 
say that it is a process which benefits all countries, 
not just developed ones but also, and particularly, 
those in the developing world, since it will help to 
accelerate their growth. In defence of their viewpoint, 
they argue that multinationals usually pay better 
wages than local firms, apply higher environmental 
and employment standards than are required by 
national laws, comply more punctiliously with their 
obligations in these matters and evade taxes less often 
than local firms. The free trade that globalization has 
brought with it, meanwhile, has given local consumers 
access to cheaper, better-quality products. Regarding 
the cultural aspect, they insist that local culture still 
dominates the media (television programmes), while 
foreign culture is secondary and is usually a source 
of  diversity that has an enriching rather than a 
homogenizing effect.
The debate is too heated and involved to be 
settled in this article. We would venture two general 
opinions, however. First, while there may be attractions 
to investing in the South to take advantage of  its 
lower labour and environmental standards, this 
situation is likely to be temporary. Sooner or later, 
globalization itself  will tend to raise standards in the 
South, as the developed countries will increasingly 
make this a condition for keeping their markets open 
to exports from the South. Consequently, the countries 
of Latin America will be required to comply with 
environmental and labour legislation and not treat 
it as a dead letter, as sometimes happens, by turning 
a blind eye to violations.
Secondly, both sides of the debate exaggerate 
greatly. Globalization may not be a positive sum 
game, as its proponents claim, but neither is it a 
negative sum game, as some of its detractors suggest. 
In the debate about the North American Free Trade 
Agreement between Mexico and the United States, 
for example, detractors argued that the inhabitants 
of both countries would lose out. The fear of many 
in the United States, like the presidential candidate 
Ross Perrot, was that United States firms would set 
up in Mexico to take advantage of its much cheaper 
labour. Consequently, the Agreement would hurt the 
United States and benefit Mexico. Meanwhile, many 
Mexicans had the opposite fear: how were Mexican 
firms going to survive if  they had to compete with 
imports produced by far more productive United 
States firms? Consequently, the Agreement would 
benefit the United States at the expense of Mexico. 
Clearly, the two arguments are contradictory and 
cannot be generally true.2
Defenders of globalization who present it almost 
as a panacea for emerging countries also overstate 
their case. However important market opening may 
be for the economic development of the South, the 
crucial thing is what is done to raise their dismal 
productivity. This does not come from outside but 
essentially depends on an internal effort.
Let it be repeated that, while there can be no 
question of resolving this debate in the present article, 
it is important to bear it in mind when analysing the 
key issues of globalization that we shall highlight, as 
it contextualizes and partially determines the possible 
implications.
3. Five key facts
The huge disparities in income and productivity 
between the developed countries of  the “North” 
and the developing countries of  the “South” are 
notoriously due to the fact that the North has an 
abundance of capital and modern technology and a 
scarcity of labour. The “South”, meanwhile, has the 
opposite characteristics: capital is in short supply and 
outdated technologies prevail, while labour is relatively 
abundant. In theory, closing these divides means taking 
capital and technology from the North to the South 
and moving labour from the South to the North. 
This can be done directly by flows of capital, labour 
and technology, and also indirectly through trade in 
goods, with the South exporting its surplus labour in 
the form of highly labour-intensive goods.
2 The truth of the matter seems to be that United States firms 
whose productivity advantage outweighs the pay differential with 
Mexico export to the latter, while Mexican firms whose productivity 
disadvantage is not as great as the pay differential export to the 
United States. Thus, more productive firms and activities in each 
country will expand and less productive ones decline. While the 
net effect may be positive, there will be gainers and losers in both 
countries. Furthermore, the two sides will not necessarily gain alike, 
whence the need for skilful negotiations and a national economic 
policy that is in keeping with development needs.
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It is true that globalization tends in this direction. 
To anticipate the conclusions that will follow, however 
advanced globalization may be, current flows are much 
less than are needed to rapidly close these income and 
productivity gaps. Furthermore, we shall observe a 
large asymmetry between the different flows, as some 
are very substantial (trade in goods), some are scant 
(migration and technology flows) and others are 
somewhere in the middle (capital flows).
The first fact is the growing importance of 
international trade, i.e., flows of  goods between 
countries. Figure 1 shows the growth in the world’s 
export volumes and gross domestic product (GDP) 
since 1870: first from 1870 to 1950, then from 1950 to 
the present. From 1870 to 1950, exports and GDP grew 
at similar rates, with both more or less quintupling 
over the period. However, in the second period, from 
1950 to the present, exports have exploded. They have 
increased 22-fold, compared to a large (7.5-fold) but 
lesser increase in GDP. Thus, taking the entire period 
from 1870 to the present, we find that while global 
GDP has multiplied 36-fold in those 138 years, i.e., 
at a rate of about 2.6% a year, exports have grown 
130-fold, i.e., at a rate of some 3.6% a year.
Consequently, exports as a share of GDP have 
more than quadrupled from 5% of GDP in 1870 to 
23% in 2008 (see figure 2). Although this represents 
extraordinary growth, the fact remains that three 
quarters of what is produced each year continues to 
be consumed domestically, and the reason for this is 
that much of this annual production consists of goods 
that are difficult or impossible to export. In practice, 
the great bulk of  spending on health, education, 
government, commerce, services and construction, 
typically making up 60% of each country’s GDP, is 
not tradable internationally.
This increase in international trade has been 
due to a whole range of factors. Among the most 
important are large reductions in transport costs, 
both between 1870 and 1950 and from 1950 to the 
present day. Second, there is the process of economic 
integration in Europe since the Second World 
War, culminating in its common market and single 
currency. Third, and once again since 1950, there 
have been the different rounds of multilateral tariff  
cuts promoted by the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), following large tariff  increases in 
the period between the two world wars. Lastly, there 
FIGURE 1
World export and GDP growth, 1870 to present
(Index: 1950=100)
Source: Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), 2001, and author’s information from 1998 onward.
N.B.: The 1870-1950 and 1950-2008 periods are separated for presentation purposes.
Exports : 130-fold
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are the numerous bilateral and subregional economic 
integration agreements concluded in the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first centuries.
In Latin America, this increase in trade has been 
partly driven by the trade liberalization policies brought 
in during the 1980s following the external debt crisis. 
This was a time when the region’s countries made a 
strategic shift from an industrialization strategy based 
on high tariff protection and import substitution to a 
low-tariff  exporting model. The average tariff  in the 
region dropped from about 30% in the early 1980s to 
some 10% now (see table 1). Innumerable bilateral and 
subregional trade agreements have also been signed or 
given greater depth. As a result, the share of exports 
in Latin American economies has risen from some 
13% of GDP in 1980 to about 25% now.
Nonetheless, most international trade is not 
between developed countries, which export industrial 
products, and developing ones, which export raw 
materials, but consists of different industrial exports 
from one country of the North to another. Thus, 77% 
of exports from the North go to other countries in the 
North (see table 2), with just 23% going to the South. 
This perhaps unexpected finding is due to the fact that 
more exports go to markets with greater purchasing 
power. Again, many of the “comparative advantages” 
of the North reside not so much in capital-intensive 
industries as in knowledge-intensive ones; and there 
can be no doubt that most knowledge is currently 
generated in the North. It is for these two reasons 
that the bulk of exports from the North go to other 
countries of the North.
Precisely because trade in goods leads each country 
to specialize in whatever it is relatively efficient at, 
it also allows countries with an abundance of raw 
materials and labour, such as those of  the South, 
to export some of this abundance to the markets of 
the North in the form of raw material- and labour-
intensive goods. Nonetheless, since much raw material 
production is capital-intensive (mining and energy, for 
example), in net terms our exports are not particularly 
labour-intensive. Thus it is that our exports are a very 
imperfect substitute for the movement of factors, i.e., 
for the migration of labour from the South, where 
it is abundant, to the North, where it is scarce, and 
for the movement of capital in the other direction, 
FIGURE 2 
Exports as a percentage of GDP, 1870 to present
Source: Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), 2001, and author’s information from 1998 onward.
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from the North, where it is abundant, to the South, 
where it is scarce.
Without a doubt, the sheer scale of goods and 
services flows makes exports and trade liberalization 
the most salient feature of globalization.
The second fact, next after trade in importance, 
is the flow of capital between countries and, more 
specifically, foreign direct investment (FDI). Table 3 
shows that some US$ 1.8 trillion of capital is invested 
outside its country of origin each year in the form of 
FDI. As might be expected, 90% of this investment 
originates in the developed countries. Perhaps 
surprisingly, though, the bulk of  this investment 
(two thirds) goes to other developed countries in the 
North, where capital is also abundant, and not to 
capital-scarce developing countries, which receive a 
third of this investment. The reason for this is that 
FDI is not only deployed to extract natural resources 
and then process them (which is what FDI is typically 
for in the South), but is also used, and on an even 
larger scale, to take advantage of the proximity of 
large markets, most of them in the North. Thus, the 
purpose of  FDI in the South is usually to extract 
natural resources, copper for example, and then turn 
them into industrial products in the North such as 
electrical cables. Conversely, the usual reason for siting 
FDI in the North is for a firm to position itself  close 
to large markets, examples being Japanese car plants 
in the United States and United States car plants 
in Europe. This explains why most FDI is between 
developed countries.
It should be noted, however, that FDI in 
developing countries has been growing rapidly, from 
US$ 6 billion in Latin America in 1980 to 20 times 
TABLE 1
Tariff reductions in Latin America, 1980-2006
(Percentages)
Country Mid-1980s  2006  Reduction (points)
Argentina  28  12  -16
Brazil  52  9  -43
Chile  20  6  -14
Colombia  28  12  -16
Ecuador  28  9  -19
Mexico  12  11  -1
Peru  40  7  -33
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)  33  15  -18
Latin America  30  10  -20




Trade flows  Global imports Developed-country 
imports
Developing-country imports
   
(Latin America)
Global exports  13.9  9.8   4.1
      (0.75)
Developed-country exports  9.8  7.5 77%  2.3
 71%     (0.54)
Developing-country exports   4.1  2.3 56%   1.8
 29%     (0.21)
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 2009, Washington, D.C., 2009. 
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that amount now (see table 4). This is all the more 
important considering that FDI is likely to bring with 
it more and better technology than local investment, 
so that foreign investment has become an important 
factor in the development of the South. It must be 
recognized, however, that this still represents less than 
a fifth of the investment carried out each year in Latin 
America and an even lower percentage (a mere 3.7%) 
of the region’s GDP, which shows that international 
factor mobility falls considerably short of what the 
textbooks predict.
The fact is that 90% of  all investment in the 
world still has a strongly “insular” tendency, i.e., is 
carried out within the home country. Although there 
are probably more investment opportunities in the 
emerging economies of the South than in the mature 
markets of the North, the great majority of firms still 
prefer to invest in their home markets. There are all 
sorts of reasons for this “non-globalizing” tendency: 
businesses have a better understanding of opportunities 
in their own markets, these opportunities are more 
circumscribed by local legislation, or owners are not 
willing to capitalize enough to internationalize, as this 
would dilute their control over the firm.
One consequence of this “under-globalization” 
of  capital from the North, neglecting important 
investment opportunities in the South, is to lower the 
potential returns on capital in the North. Those who 
come off  worst, however, are the abundant workers 
of the South, who, in the absence of strong capital 
flows from the North, are forced to take employment 
in local firms with their outdated technology and low 
capital intensity, and the low wages and productivity 
that result.
This point is not invalidated by the argument, 
put forward by many critics of  globalization and 
FDI, that a great many firms come to the South to 
take advantage of low wages. While this may well be 
their motivation, the more of them that set up in the 
South, the greater the demand for labour will be and 
the stronger the eventual upward pressure on local 
wages. This is what happened in Japan. The country 
started out with highly labour-intensive, low-paying 
industries, but labour became less and less abundant 
as the years passed and investment increased, and 
wages (and productivity) rose as a result, so that Japan 
now pays higher wages than the United States. The 
same thing happened in the Republic of Korea and 
Taiwan Province of China, and is happening now 
in China and India. In the long run, therefore, FDI 
makes labour less abundant and raises wages, but this 
effect is neither immediate nor automatic. It depends 
on national policies, and it needs to be supported by 
the power of unions.3
3  This may be why most studies find that wages paid by transnational 
enterprises in the South are substantially higher than local wages. 
Either they pay better because they bring higher standards from 
their home countries, or they do so to increase productivity, 
allowing our unions to capture part of this rent if  they negotiate 
well. See, once again, Micklethwait and Woolridge (2000) and 
Brown, Deardorff  and Stern (2003).
TABLE 3 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) worldwide, 2007
(Trillions of dollars)
FDI  World receives  Developed countries receive  Developing countries receive 
(Latin America)
World invests  1.8  1.2  0.6
   (0.125)
Developed countries invest  1.7  0.115  0.55
Developing countries invest  0.1  0.05  0.05
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 2009, Washington, D.C., 2009.
TABLE 4
Foreign direct investment (FDI)
in Latin America, 1980-2007
(Millions of dollars)
 1980 2004 2007
FDI in Latin America 5 700 60 000 126 300
FDI/GDP 0.4% 3.0% 3.7%
FDI/total investment 2.0% 15.0% 17.8%
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2008 (UNCTAD/WIR/2008), 
New York, 2008. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.08.
II.D.3; and Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America 
and the Caribbean 2008 (LC/G.2406-P), Santiago, Chile, 2008.
Review 100i (julio) 13.indd   103 13/7/10   11:20:37
104
53"%&6/*0/4*/5)&i4065)w*/5)&&3"0'(-0#"-*;"5*0/t +04&1)3".04
$ & 1 " -  3 & 7 * & 8      t  " 1 3 * -     
These effects are produced not only by FDI, of  
course, but by any kind of investment, be it local or 
foreign, and all investment is therefore to be encouraged. 
Since only a relatively small share of FDI goes to the 
South, however (a third of the total), and most of this 
is sited in relatively few countries (China and Brazil, 
among others), there is ample scope for attracting 
such investment to other countries. Furthermore, 
FDI usually brings better technology with it, and thus 
tends to create more productive and better-paid jobs. 
This is why it is important for the region’s unions to 
encourage both greater investment in general and a 
larger flow of FDI to the South. More FDI widens the 
scope for countries of the South and their unions to 
raise potential productivity and wages, an option 
that will not exist if  these countries receive little in 
the way of FDI, as has been the case with most of the 
economies of the South to date.
The third channel of globalization is the migration 
of labour, which may be potentially the fastest and 
most direct way of raising incomes and productivity in 
the world as labour moves from where it is abundant 
(the South) to where it is scarce (the North). As we 
shall shortly see, however, it is the channel that is 
least used and, indeed, least discussed. And when 
it is discussed, it is perhaps the one that arouses the 
strongest feelings in both the North and the South.
It is not that there is no migration, but that it is 
proceeding at a snail’s pace. As expected (see table 5), 
migration takes place mainly from developing to 
developed countries. It can be seen from table 6, 
however, that annual migration (legal, that is), while 
large in absolute terms (2.6 million a year), is low 
compared to annual population growth: 3.2% of the 
world’s annual population increase and just 3% of the 
annual increase in the population of the South. To 
provide an example and a comparison, it is estimated 
that a third of the increase in population in Europe 
during the nineteenth century was absorbed by 
migration to the New World.4 A comparable figure 
would require a 10-fold increase in today’s level of 
migration from South to North!
As already mentioned, feelings on the issue 
run high on both sides. Although today’s migration 
represents only a small percentage of  developing 
countries’ population growth, the sharp slowdown of 
population growth in the North means that 54% of this 
is accounted for by migration from the South (which 
4  Estimate based on Maddison (2001).
actually supplies over 100% of population growth 
in Europe and Japan, with a much lower percentage 
only in the United States and Oceania). This is why 
many in the North resent these workers taking away 
their jobs and driving down their high wages, and 
why there is such strong nationalist pressure to halt 
migration, both legal and, obviously, illegal.
As for the South, it wounds people’s pride that 
so many of their compatriots have to leave their home 
country in search of a better life abroad. There is 
also concern in the countries of the South about a 
“brain drain” depriving them of the resource they 
have invested most in and have most need of.
Against these legitimate concerns we must set 
the benefits of migration. First, it usually means a 
substantial improvement in the living standards of 
migrants themselves in terms not just of incomes but 
of health and learning as well. The less skilled the 
emigrant, the greater the benefit, for while wages in 
the North are higher than those in the South in all 
professions and occupations, the gap is particularly 
large for low-skilled workers, who earn something like 
subsistence wages in the South but are paid decently 
in the North by local standards and very handsomely 
indeed by those of the South. Although there are pay 
gaps for professionals, they are substantially less, 
particularly when adjusted for actual differences in 
the cost of living.
Second, there is a positive effect for those who 
do not migrate. For one thing, migration reduces 
competition for the few good jobs available locally. 
For another, emigrants usually send remittances to 
their families in the South. Remittances to the South 
last year are estimated at US$ 328 billion, or 2.5 times 
the external assistance provided by the countries of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).5 For example, remittances 
by Indians abroad exceeded FDI in India that year! 
And remittances are not confined to money, there are 
also “remittances” of ideas. Indeed, there is evidence 
of a substantial transfer of knowledge in this way. 
Some of the success of the information technology 
production cluster in Bangalore, India, for example, 
is due to Indian engineers who formerly worked in 
Silicon Valley and used their knowledge to set up 
similar businesses in Bangalore. On a smaller scale, 
similar phenomena can be seen in the case of African 
and Central American emigrants returning to their 
5  See “Migration and development: the aid workers who really 
help” in The Economist, 10 October 2009.
Review 100i (julio) 13.indd   104 13/7/10   11:20:38
105
53"%&6/*0/4*/5)&i4065)w*/5)&&3"0'(-0#"-*;"5*0/t +04&1)3".04






Main countries of  origin
(percentages)
United States 1 160 000 Mexico China Philippines India Cuba
  18 7 5 4 3
Spain 405 000 Morocco Ecuador Romania United Kingdom Colombia
  14 11 10 7 6
Germany 220 000 Poland Turkey Romania Hungary Italy
  18 7 4 4 2
Canada 210 000 China India Philippines Pakistan United States
  12 12 8 4 3
United Kingdom 137 000 Australia France United States New Zealand India
  9 8 7 6 5
World 2 600 000      





Scale of migration, by development level
 World Developed countries Developing countries
Immigration (millions of  people a year) 2.6 2.6 -2.6
Population (millions of  inhabitants) 6 500 1 200 5 300
Population growth (millions of  people a year) 82 5 77
Percentage of  population 1.3% 0.4% 1.5%
Immigration (as percentage of  population growth) 3.2% 54% -3%
Source: United Nations, International Migration Report 2006: A Global Assessment (ESA/P/WP.209), New York, 2006.
home countries with capital and ideas to make their 
projects work.
For reasons like the above, the latest Human 
Development Report of the United Nations concluded 
that migration yielded a net benefit both for those 
emigrating and for those remaining in their home 
countries, and that it was clearly beneficial too for 
the recipient countries themselves.6 
Nonetheless, there are large barriers to migration, 
particularly for the low-skilled, who are precisely the 
people most likely to benefit from the opportunity to 
migrate. Migration continues to be seen as something 
6  United Nations (2009).
each country may legitimately restrict at will. And 
by contrast with customs tariffs or barriers to capital 
inflows or outflows, not only is it unquestioned that 
countries have the right to restrict migration, but 
there is little awareness that they might have a duty 
to remove such barriers to migration. This is why the 
latest Human Development Report, which advocates 
reducing and liberalizing barriers to immigration for 
the low-skilled in particular, is so important.7 Hitherto, 
7  See United Nations (2009). The Report advocates a six-pillared 
package of reforms including, among other things, liberalization and 
facilitation of immigration for the low-skilled, for both temporary 
and permanent jobs; guarantees for the basic rights of immigrants 
in destination countries; and reduction of the transaction costs 
involved in migration.
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there has been no international organization calling for 
steady reductions in the restrictions on immigration, 
as there are to encourage trade and capital flows. This 
is therefore a field that merits determined action by 
unions in the South, since emigration of low-skilled 
labour can significantly alleviate the negative pressure 
on labour markets in the South.
A fourth form taken on by globalization is the 
imitation, purchase and transfer of best practices and 
technologies. Over 80% of patents are generated in the 
developed countries, and much the same is presumably 
true of  unpatented innovations. It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that the bulk of  technology 
transfer will be from North to South. Furthermore, 
the enormous productivity gaps between the two 
suggest that transfer flows ought to be large.
Some of this transfer takes place through the 
purchase of equipment incorporating technological 
improvements. Indeed, almost half of all fixed capital 
investment is in equipment and machinery; expressed 
as a proportion of GDP, that means that some 10% of 
GNP consists of imported equipment incorporating 
modern technology. Another part of the technology 
flow consists in (smart) imitation and local adaptation 
of international best practices (the idea of shopping 
malls or mini-markets, or just-in-time production, 
for example, can be copied without having to pay 
anything). Lastly, another element is the payment 
of royalties for licences and franchises.
Given the huge productivity gaps and technological 
backwardness of developing countries, these could be 
expected to buy technology in large amounts. Indeed, 
as might be anticipated, successful emerging countries 
such as the Republic of Korea, Portugal and Spain 
spend 2.5 times as much on technology transfers (some 
0.5% of GDP) as the developed countries themselves 
(see table 7). Conversely, and unexpectedly, the 
opposite is true of Latin America. It is striking that, 
other than in Argentina, royalty payments as a share 
of GDP in the Latin American countries run at only a 
fifth of their levels in successful emerging countries. 
Even more surprisingly, technology purchases in the 
region run at just half the rate seen among developed 
countries (0.1% of GDP as against 0.2% of GDP in 
the developed countries).
In other words, technology transfer to Latin 
America falls well short of what it could be and ought 
to be for economies like those of the region, lagging 
as they do so far behind the technology frontier and 
international best practices. As a result of this slow 
transfer of technology, the huge gaps in productivity 
and thus incomes that separate Latin America from 
the developed economies have tended to persist.
Fifth, late-developing countries have one, and 
only one, great advantage. It is that once they have 
dealt with the institutional and endemic limitations 
of  underdevelopment, they have the capacity to 
grow at much higher rates than the countries that 
historically were the first to develop. The later a 
country’s development begins, the further behind the 
technology frontier it is, and thus the more quickly it 
can grow by bypassing whole stages of development 
and copying and adapting the modern technologies 
best suited to it. This is the phenomenon known as 
“catch-up” (see figure 3). This explains why Japan 
was able to grow so rapidly from the late nineteenth 
century; why subsequently, from 1950 onward, the 
“tigers” grew even faster than Japan during their 
miracle; and why continental China has been expanding 
at unprecedented rates since the 1980s, its per capita 
growth rate of over 7.5% far outstripping anything 
the “tigers” ever achieved. Nor can there be any 
doubt that much of the “Chilean miracle” from the 
mid-1980s to the present has been due to its success 
in finally capitalizing on this, the one great advantage 
of being a late-developing country.
TABLE 7
Technology transfer licensing payments
(Percentages)
Country/region Annual licensing payments/GDP










Emerging countries  
 Republic of  Korea 0.50
 Portugal 0.60
 Spain 0.40
Source: Roberto Álvarez, Gustavo Crespi and Joseph Ramos, 
“The impact of  licenses on a ‘late starter’ LDC: Chile in the 
1990s”, World Development, vol. 30, No. 8, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 
August 2002.
GDP: Gross domestic product.
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Far from closing the technology and best 
practice gaps with the developed countries, however, 
productivity in Latin America, with the exception of 
Chile, has grown by less than that of the developed 
countries from 1980 to the present, so that the 
technology frontier has receded even further.8 This 
shows how much remains to be done in this field. 
It must be stressed once again that the possibility 
of securing decent jobs with decent wages requires 
productivity levels much higher than are currently 
the norm in the region’s countries.
To attain these goals, the transfer of technology 
and best practices is an even more vital factor than 
trade, FDI and migration.9 This is the potential flow 
8  See Castaldi and others (2009).
9  None of  this is an argument against domestic research and 
innovation. The region currently invests little in research and 
development (R&D): some 0.6% of GDP. Although technology 
transfer will undoubtedly be more important for Latin America 
than endogenous technological innovation in its current stage of 
development, some R&D is needed just to be able to assimilate 
and adapt international technologies and best practices. Again, 
while most firms in the region are a long way from the technology 
frontier, some of them, including many natural resource exporters, 
are close to it, which means that they need to carry out substantial 
R&D investment if  they wish to maintain their elevated rents.
that is there to be exploited in future by developing 
countries, and Latin America in particular. Indeed, for 
all his criticisms of globalization, Stiglitz emphasizes 
that it is this capability – that of identifying the most 
suitable technologies and practices for their countries 
and then adapting, assimilating and disseminating 
them – that ultimately explains the Japanese miracle, 
that of the “Asian tigers” and those of China and 
India today. It was this ability to imitate, adapt and 
assimilate technologies, far more than orthodox 
neoliberal policies, that he considers to account for 
their success.10
In summary, a review of globalization, like the 
one conducted so far, yields one great conclusion: 
globalization has not advanced quickly or slowly so 
10  See Stiglitz (2003). Indeed, that author argues that there have 
been large departures from neoliberal doctrine: some countries 
have engaged in far-reaching State intervention based on large 
local enterprises (Republic of  Korea); some (Taiwan Province 
of China) have favoured the development of medium-sized firms 
for military reasons; others have opted to attract multinationals 
(Singapore); others again have developed with a large State sector 
(China) in both the productive economy and, particularly, the 
financial system. Until recently, furthermore, all these approaches 
were combined with substantial tariff  barriers.
FIGURE 3
Catch-up: the great potential advantage of late development
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, Paris, Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2001, and author’s information.
N.B.: The vertical axis measures per capita income, the horizontal axis years. The values below each of  the countries indicate the 
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much as asymmetrically, since goods, capital, labour and 
technology have flowed at very different speeds.
i) So far, globalization has advanced most quickly 
where trade in goods is concerned, with Latin American 
exports rising to 25% of GDP. This is followed by 
FDI flows, which have come to account for 18% of 
all annual investment. Conversely, globalization has 
progressed much less in the areas of technology transfer 
and migration. Unfortunately, these are probably 
the very two factors that could most quickly and 
directly improve living standards in the region, with 
its abundant labour and low-productivity jobs.
ii) There is much more globalization between 
developed countries (North-North) than between 
developed and developing ones (North-South). Two 
thirds of FDI and three quarters of exports are between 
developed countries.
iii) Only migration takes place mainly between 
South and North, but it is advancing at rates that 
are not high in absolute terms (3% of developing 
countries’ population growth) and are much lower 
than the rates seen in nineteenth-century Europe.
Consequently (see table 8), the developing world, 
with 81% of the world’s population, produces just 
26% of global GDP. This is because it accounts for 
only 19% of all patents each year and 29% of exports, 
while it is home to just 14% of the world’s largest 
enterprises. The developing world weighs only in terms 
of population and the percentage of raw materials it 






3. Percentage of  500 largest firms 14
4. Patents 19
5. Exports 36
6. Raw material exports 37
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), Development and Globalization: Facts and Figures, 
Geneva, 2006.




Unions play a multiplicity of roles both within firms 
and in society as a whole. The focus in what follows 
will be on their function in collective negotiations 
with firms. There are many, particularly among 
proponents of more orthodox economic theories, who 
see unions simply as actual or incipient monopolies 
that raise wages for their members at the expense of 
jobs for those excluded. It is undeniable that a union, 
especially if  it is strong, can produce this effect. But 
this is an exaggeratedly restrictive view of the typical 
or average union.
Thus, more sophisticated labour market theories 
see unions as institutions that improve, or can 
improve, the workings of the market. First, there are 
markets with imperfect competition, in which the 
firm concerned generates rents in excess of normal 
profitability. In these cases, it will be in the interests of 
the firm to keep the whole of the rent deriving from 
its market power, paying its workers on the basis of 
their opportunity cost (their value to other firms) 
and not their actual productivity. In these situations, 
a critical task for the union will be to press for some 
of these rents to be transferred to its members. In 
these cases, the distribution of this rent will depend 
on the negotiating power of the parties and, within 
wide margins, will have no distorting effect on the 
allocation of resources.11
Secondly, even in fully competitive markets, 
there is often another type of rent that gives rise to a 
margin of “legitimate indeterminacy” where wages are 
concerned. This can be understood better if  we begin 
with the most orthodox analysis of the workings of 
competitive markets. According to this, the pressure 
characterizing relationships in competitive markets 
is known as “exit”. In other words, if  someone does 
not like a product, they stop buying it and choose 
another. This “exit” sends the producer a message 
that he must improve the quality or price of  the 
11 See Benavente, Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2009) for an interesting 
analysis of  how rents are distributed in accordance with the 
bargaining power of workers in France, Belgium and Chile.
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product, or both, or otherwise perish. In the labour 
market, similarly, anyone dissatisfied with the working 
conditions of his firm can leave, and his “exit” will 
put pressure on the firm to adapt its operations to 
the demands of its workforce.
Exit is undeniably an important form of pressure, 
but it is not the only one. Particularly in markets with 
more or less skilled labour, where relationships are 
deeper and longer-term and where exit costs are high, 
there is also a place for pressure exerted by means 
of “voice”. Unions provide this voice.12 Firms are 
sensitive to such pressure because they know that the 
effort put in by their staff  largely depends on how 
fairly they believe they are being treated.
There is, then, an area of “legitimate indeterminacy” 
where wages are concerned. Although the market sets 
limits or ranges to how much is to be paid for a certain 
type of labour, this is rarely an exact amount other 
than in highly exceptional markets. There is normally 
a range of 5% to 10% around a certain value. This 
range depends on all the factors that can make the 
productivity of a worker or group of workers higher 
in one particular firm than in the general run of firms. 
Among other factors, for example, their productivity 
may be greater because they have acquired specific 
knowledge about the workings of  their firm, or 
because they have forged a good team spirit with 
colleagues, making the productivity of each greater 
than it would be in another firm. There is thus a range 
of “legitimate indeterminacy” corresponding to the 
greater productivity workers may have in their firm 
by comparison with the general run of firms. This 
greater productivity generates a rent that may be 
appropriated by the worker or by the firm or divided 
between the two, without greatly affecting the level of 
employment.13 This rent is a subject for negotiation, 
and “voice” is the most efficient way of going about 
this. Thus, one of the key roles of a union is to express 
the “voice” of workers as a group.
Third, apart from collective bargaining as such, 
in medium-sized or large firms there will always be 
12 Originated by Hirschman (1970), this theory has been very 
usefully applied to the world of unions by Freeman and Medoff 
(1984), among others. See also Pencavel (2008) and Dussaillant 
(2008).
13  Much more may be demanded, in which case there will be a 
distorting effect, with wages being raised not just at the expense 
of the firm’s rents but at the cost of a lower level of employment. 
What is meant here by the area of “legitimate” indeterminacy is 
that which does not distort the allocation of resources but remains 
within the bounds set by the greater specific productivity of workers 
in that firm by comparison with the rest.
situations that are not covered by employment contracts 
and require interpretation or new agreements. Employers 
are obviously attracted by an arrangement in which they 
take decisions or impose their will without argument. 
This lends itself to arbitrary behaviour, however, and 
can ultimately damage labour relations, thereby affecting 
morale and thence productivity. This is why unions 
have the function of representing worker interests and 
legitimizing agreements. Given that labour productivity 
and performance are known to depend not only on 
workers’ capacities, but on how fairly they feel they 
are being treated, this legitimizing function of the 
union benefits both the firm and its workers.
These roles of  distributing rents, negotiating 
ranges of  “legitimate indeterminacy”, checking 
arbitrary behaviour and facilitating unanticipated 
new agreements are vital and positive roles of 
unions, greatly valued by workers and, in large firms 
particularly, valued too by the employers themselves. 
This is why modern theories of labour relations do 
not regard these as essentially adversarial, with one 
side necessarily gaining at the other’s expense (a “zero 
sum game”), but treat them as potentially beneficial 
all round if  well conducted. Negotiated working 
conditions are viewed as fair and thus call forth a 
greater effort from employees than the same working 
conditions when they are imposed and employees 
feel their views have not been considered, since their 
productivity depends on their motivation, and their 
motivation depends in part on whether they feel their 
interests have been taken into account.
2. The view of workers
The above may seem theoretical, but it is amply borne 
out by experience. In a survey recently carried out by 
the Equity Commission of the Government of Chile, 
the following results were obtained:14
i. Between 75% and 80% of workers consider a 
union to be important or very important for 
securing fair treatment, more of a say in their 
company’s decisions, better wages and more 
stable employment.
ii. 49% consider that unions have a positive effect 
on productivity; only 5% believe their effect to 
be negative.
14 See Consejo Asesor Presidencial, Trabajo y Equidad (2008). 
This government-appointed commission was composed of “wise 
men” from a wide range of political, academic, business and union 
backgrounds, and many of its conclusions were unanimous.
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iii, 81% think it would be desirable to improve 
workers’ collective bargaining capacity.
iv. While 68% feel trust or a great deal of trust in 
the promises of their company’s management, a 
large percentage (27%) have little or no trust in 
management, whence the need for an organization 
like a union to give greater credibility to whatever 
is agreed upon.
v. By contrast with the ultra-orthodox position 
that labour relations are a “zero sum game”, 
66% of workers believe that relations between 
their union and their firm are cooperative or very 
cooperative, with only a fraction (20%) regarding 
them as adversarial or very adversarial.
The same survey also shows that the closer the 
source of  authority is, the better labour relations 
tend to be, and obviously that the more remote it is, 
the worse they tend to be. This alone would explain 
the greater need for a union in large firms, where 
employment conditions are not set by the immediate 
supervisor but tend to be more impersonal and 
distant. For example, whereas 82% of respondents 
say they have a good or very good relationship with 
their immediate supervisor, this positive appreciation 
drops to 65% in the case of company management 
and 46% in the case of the company’s owners.
3. The importance of unions
Unions can be important when they contain a large 
percentage of the workforce, as in the Nordic countries, 
and when union contracts are extended to the non-
unionized workforce, as in France where, despite 
declining union membership, the coverage of such 
contracts has increased.
Nonetheless, it should be observed (see table 9) 
that there has been a fall in both the percentage of 
workers in unions (down 33%) and the coverage of 
union-negotiated contracts (down by a lesser but still 
substantial 22%) in most of the OECD countries over 
the past 25 years. A similar downward trend can be 
seen in Latin America (see table 10).15
This decline in the percentage of  unionized 
workers is due to many factors, among which 
mention may be made of  the following:16 greater 
international competition due to globalization, and 
thus a decline in the monopolistic rents available to 
be shared out between firms and workers, making 
unionization less attractive; technological changes 
that have facilitated decentralization and outsourcing 
of jobs, reducing typical company size (smaller firms 
are usually less unionized); the growing weight of 
the (far less unionized) “tertiary” sector in economy 
activity and the declining share of manufacturing 
employment (highly unionized for the most part); 
the growing importance of professional and white-
collar occupations in firms, as these are typically less 
unionized; the rise in female employment, which is 
normally less unionized both because of the type of 
work women do and because their participation in the 
workforce is more intermittent; anti-union policies and 
15 See Dussaillant (2008).
16 See Pencavel (2008).
TABLE 9
Unionization and coverage of union-negotiated contracts
(Selected OECD countries, percentages)
Country Percentage of  workers unionized  Percentage change in coverage of  union-
negotiated contracts (1980-2000)
1980 2000 Percentage change  
United Kingdom 51 31 -39  -57
Japan 31 22 -29  -40
United States 22 13 -41  -46
Germany 35 25 -29  -15
France 18 10 -44  13
Sweden 80 79 -1  13
Australia 48 25 -48  0
Italy 50 35 -30  0
OECD 32 21 -33  -22
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD Employment Outlook, Paris, 2004.
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practices; and the disrepute into which some unions 
have fallen because of their lack of transparency and 
internal democracy. In fact, it is only in public-sector 
activities that unionization is on the increase.
4. The effects of unionization on employment 
and income distribution
As mentioned earlier, one of  the most frequent 
criticisms of unions from an orthodox perspective is 
that they raise their members’ wages at the expense 
of employment. Thus, by imposing a wage higher 
than is justified by worker productivity and market 
conditions (i.e., outside the upper end of the range 
of legitimate indeterminacy), unions force firms to 
reduce recruitment, with the result that unemployment 
or informality rises. Although a thorough test of 
this hypothesis is beyond the scope of the present 
study, some light can be shed on it by examining 
whether, as this hypothesis would have it: (i) countries 
with a higher degree of  unionization have higher 
unemployment (the sample used in this study are the 
OECD countries in 2000 or thereabouts) and (ii) the 
decline of unionization in the last 25 years (from the 
1980s to the early 2000s) has been accompanied by 
a drop in unemployment.
Figure 4 examines the relationship between 
the percentage of the workforce which is unionized 
and unemployment in OECD countries around 2000. 
Contrary to the conventional orthodox hypothesis, the 
feared positive relationship between unemployment 
and unionization is not observed.17 To take this a step 
further, figure 5 shows this relationship over time (from 
1980 to the early 2000s), i.e., it examines whether, as 
the conventional hypothesis suggests, unemployment 
fell by more in countries where unionization retreated 
most, such as the United States, the United Kingdom 
and Japan, and whether it increased less in countries 
where union membership fell by less or even rose, such 
as Finland, Iceland, Belgium and Sweden. Once again, 
no statistically significant relationship is observed 
between increasing (decreasing) unemployment rates 
and rising (falling) union membership rates.
This conclusion is borne out by more detailed 
OECD (2004) studies using multiple control variables, 
which show that between 1970 and 2000 there was 
no robust relationship between union membership 
and unemployment rates.18 The ambiguity or lack of 
robustness of the relationship between unemployment 
17  The finding is similar if  we compare union membership and 
unemployment around 1980. The lack of  significance cannot 
therefore be put down to the period chosen.
18  While, as conventional theory suggests, OECD (2004) finds that 
higher unemployment is associated with greater coverage of collective 
bargaining for some periods and some regressions between 1970 
and 2000, the relationship between higher unemployment and a 
higher unionization rate is not significant for any regression or 
period. And although, as conventional theory suggests, higher 
collective bargaining coverage correlates with less employment 
of older people, greater unionization is associated with higher 
employment in general and higher female employment in particular, 
contrary to what the orthodox theory would predict. Given 
such inconsistent, ambiguous and unstable results, OECD (2004) 
concludes that there is no robust correlation between unionization 
and unemployment.
TABLE 10
Unionization in Latin America
(Percentages)
Country Start year End year Percentage change
Argentina 68 (1986) 50 (1995) -26
Colombia 25 (1985) 18 (1995) -28
Costa Rica 30 (1985) 18 (1995) -40
Chile 16 (1990) 15 (2006) -7
El Salvador 10 (1985) 11 (1995) 10
Guatemala 10 (1985) 8 (1994) -20
Mexico 42 (1991) 20 (1997) -52
Panama 21 (1991) 20 (1995) -5
Uruguay 30 (1988) 21 (1993) -30
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 29 (1988) 18 (1993) -38
Source: Francisca Dussaillant, “Sindicatos y negociación colectiva”, Documento de trabajo, No. 374, Santiago, Chile, Centro de 
Estudios Públicos, 2008.
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FIGURE 4
Relationship between union membership and employment 
(OECD, 2000) 
FIGURE 5
Effect of falling union membership on unemployment
(1980s-2000s)
Source: based on data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2000.
N.B.: There is no statistically significant relationship between the unemployment rate and the unionization rate.
Source: based on data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
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and unionization suggests that the interaction between 
these variables is influenced by a variety of institutional 
arrangements that can heighten or actually reverse 
the conventional relationship expected. Conversely, 
this ambiguity or lack of  robustness is consistent 
with our hypothesis that unions mainly raise wages 
within the range of “legitimate indeterminacy” but 
do not generally abuse it, so that a higher degree of 
unionization is not usually “distortionary”, i.e., does 
not have a significant effect on employment levels.
In complete contrast to the above hypothesis, 
proponents of  unionization argue that, by raising 
wages within the range of “legitimate indeterminacy”, 
particularly for the most vulnerable, unions reduce 
wage inequality or at least help to keep it within 
acceptable limits. If  this claim is true: (i) wage 
inequality ought to be less in highly unionized 
countries (such as the Nordic ones) and greater in 
countries with a low degree of unionization (such as 
France, Spain and the United States); and (ii) wage 
inequality ought to have increased in countries where 
union membership has fallen by more (Japan, the 
United Kingdom and the United States) or by much 
more than in countries where unionization declined 
only modestly or actually increased.
Figure 6 relates union membership to wage 
inequality around the year 2000. The results of the 
regression are consistent with this hypothesis: the 
higher the degree of  unionization, the lower the 
degree of inequality.19 And this time the relationship 
is statistically significant. For example, a country with 
a unionization rate of 20% will have an inequality 
ratio of  some 3.4 between the highest and lowest 
wage deciles, while a country with a unionization 
rate of  40% will have an inequality ratio between 
deciles of 3 to 1.
This hypothesis is confirmed when trends in union 
membership and inequality are observed over time. 
The larger the fall in the unionization rate between 
1980 and 2000, the greater the percentage increase 
in wage inequality (see figure 7), and once again the 
relationship is statistically significant. A reduction of 
33% in the degree of unionization (from 32% to 21%), 
as seen on average in the OECD between 1980 and 2000, 
increases wage inequality by some 9%. In other words, 
if  inequality between the first and tenth deciles was 
19  For a better comparison, inequality between the highest and lowest 
wage deciles is measured for men in full-time employment.
FIGURE 6
The relationship between unionization and inequality
(OECD, 2000)
Source: based on data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
N.B.: Relationship significant at a 95% confidence level.
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3 to 1, then 33% lower unionization would increase 
the inequality between deciles to almost 3.3 to 1. By 
contrast with the previous hypothesis, furthermore, 
OECD (2004) finds that this relationship between 
greater unionization and lesser wage inequality is 
robust in more complex analyses.20 It thus concludes 
that the higher the rate of unionization, collective 
bargaining coverage or both, the lower the degree of 
20  The discussion about the effect of unions on employment and 
income distribution is further-reaching than the sample given 
above. Among other things, there is a huge literature on the types 
of unions (centralized or decentralized) and their repercussions. 
Again, see OECD (2004).
wage inequality, and that this finding “accords with 
a considerable number of earlier studies (Blau and 
Kahn, 1999; OECD, 1997a) and can be considered to 
be quite well established”.
On the basis of this information, we can conclude 
that a heavy burden of proof rests with the orthodox 
position, which sees unions as essentially negative 
institutions. The fact is that, besides the theoretical 
arguments in favour of  unionization (“voice” 
and not just “exit”), the available evidence for its 
repercussions on employment (non-significant) and 
equity (significant) suggests that, even if  these were 
their only effects, unions are an institution that ought 
to be encouraged rather than the reverse.
FIGURE 7
The effect of falling union membership on inequality
(OECD, 1980s-2000s)
Source: based on data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
N.B.: Relationship significant at a 95% confidence level.
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competition from abroad. Profits, if  any, were no 
longer spurious, the gift of the authorities, but real, 
deriving from the efforts of the whole firm to improve 
productivity and compete. Since higher productivity 
is the result of  cooperation between capital and 
labour, labour relations between the parties become 
more cooperative in these circumstances, while the 
main “conflict” becomes that of competing abroad. 
However, as noted earlier, cooperation between the 
parties generates a specific rent for the firm that gives 
rise to a range of “legitimate wage indeterminacy” 
requiring negotiation between the parties to determine 
its allocation.
2. The political implications for unions
What fields of  negotiation have been becoming 
more important for unions in this new globalized 
environment? We shall distinguish between fields that 
have gained in prominence outside of firms (first at 
the international level and then at the national level) 
and those that have done so within firms.
a) Outside of firms, at the international level
Whereas the ISI strategy centred on the nation 
and the firm, globalization has given rise to issues 
that transcend these and bring the international level 
to prominence. A particular issue for international 
discussion is everything connected with the asymmetries 
in the current globalization process. Globalization must 
mean the greatest flow of all factors of  production, 
not just goods and capital but technology and 
labour too.
Hitherto, it seems to have been an unquestioned 
axiom of globalization that goods and capital should 
flow as freely as possible, whereas the same is not said 
of migratory flows, for example. This subject needs to 
be considered, not as it so far has been as an exclusively 
national prerogative (of the country receiving migrants) 
but as a natural counterpart of the increased flow 
of all the factors of production. Although the 2009 
Human Development Report restates this case on 
behalf of the international community, it should be 
1. The impact of globalization on unions
Before the 1980s, the dominant strategy in Latin 
America was import substitution industrialization (ISI) 
entailing strict tariff  protection of domestic markets. 
In countries such as Mexico and Brazil, with their large 
markets, this strategy produced vigorous and indeed 
unprecedented economic growth averaging over 6% 
a year between 1945 and 1980. The strategy was less 
successful in economies with smaller domestic markets 
and thus low productivity levels, as the local market 
was often inadequate for even a single firm to achieve a 
minimum efficient scale of production. A case in point 
were Argentinean and Chilean automobile firms which, 
because of their small national markets, operated with 
a great deal of spare capacity and had to charge well 
over the international price for vehicles. Thus it was 
that the economic performance of countries such as 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay during the ISI period 
was mediocre, with per capita growth rates of some 
1.5%. This strategy was discontinued, of course, in the 
1980s, when the external debt crisis led to a strategic 
shift in the region from a domestic market-centred 
model (ISI) to a development model oriented towards 
the penetration of external markets.
These two strategies had and continue to 
have important and different implications for the 
development of the union movement in the region’s 
countries. By securing the domestic market for the 
local producer, the ISI strategy created a monopolistic 
rent for local firms at the expense of consumers. This 
rent was naturally coveted by unions, since it derived 
not from any special effort or greater productivity on 
the part of the firm, but from the protection provided 
by the political authority. It was a clear case of a zero 
sum game between capital and labour, and it naturally 
gave rise to essentially adversarial relationships.
When the region’s economies were opened up, 
external competition drastically reduced or even 
eliminated monopolistic rents, in some cases causing 
firms to shut down and in general reducing profits 
greatly. As monopolistic rents disappeared, the fate 
of  employers and their workers came to depend 
on the success of the firm as a whole in the face of 
IV
The impact of globalization on unions
and its political implications
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reinforced by unions in the South. The fact is that 
improving worker incomes in the region’s countries 
must mean reducing today’s relative abundance of 
low-skilled labour. Can there be any faster way of 
reducing this abundance than promoting greater 
migration of  low-skilled labour to the developed 
countries (where a great deal of low-skilled labour 
is needed in tasks for which demand is constantly 
increasing, such as caring for the sick and elderly)? Just 
as a relatively free flow of labour was important for 
the development of Europe in the nineteenth century, 
and just as freedom of worker movement is important 
now for the European Union and the new economies 
that have joined it from its east, so a greater flow of 
migrants to the North could be an important element 
in the improvement of working conditions for the 
masses in the South. Emigration is no substitute for 
better national development strategies, but it can very 
usefully supplement them, and it should therefore be 
firmly supported by unions in the South, backed too 
out of solidarity by unions in the North.
This does not mean the South making greater 
capital inflows conditional on the acceptance of a 
greater outflow of migration (since it could be even 
worse for developing countries to have less FDI as well 
as few opportunities for migration). But it must be 
said yet again that globalization entails the greatest 
possible flow of all factors of production between 
countries; ultimately, indeed, the unrestricted flow of 
both labour and capital. Thus the aim must be a greater 
rate of migration of labour (conditional at most on 
the culture of the recipient country being upheld): not 
just any labour, but lower-skilled labour in particular, 
in sharp contrast with the present situation where 
recipient countries accept or even attract skilled and 
professional labour but shun or reject unskilled labour. 
And once again, they do this as though migration were 
a subject of exclusively national concern, unlike the 
trade in goods and capital flows, where international 
interests are considered to take precedence over merely 
national ones. It will obviously not be easy to turn the 
present situation around, which is why it is essential 
to create an awareness that the free flow of labour 
from South to North is the natural counterpart of 
the free flow of capital in the other direction. And 
here unions in both the North and the South have 
an important role to play.
The corollary of  this defence of  unrestricted 
migration is the strengthening of  employment 
regulations in both the origin and destination 
countries. Recipient countries that have still not ratified 
international conventions protecting migrant workers 
need to do so. In any event, and as recommended by 
the 2009 Human Development Report, countries ought 
to ensure that migrants have full employment rights 
and equal pay for equal work, benefit from decent, 
safe working conditions, can organize collectively 
and enjoy full rights to education and learning of 
the destination country’s language for their children. 
Furthermore, both origin and destination countries 
ought to work together to facilitate recognition of 
educational and occupational skills acquired in the 
home country.
b) Outside of firms, at the national level
First of all, in a globalized world it is going to be 
increasingly important to uphold basic employment 
rights, not only in the letter (conventions) but 
in practice. This is important in itself  and also 
instrumentally if  the countries of the region desire 
access to international markets, since it is going to 
become more and more unacceptable to import 
from countries that do not uphold standards or that 
routinely flout them. An important role for unions 
will be to strive to ensure that national standards 
incorporate the international principles set forth in 
the different conventions and recommendations of 
the International Labour Organization (ILO).
Of course, these rules cannot be identical in detail 
to those of  developed countries, but they need to 
embody the same principles, adjusted for differences 
in development level. They should include similar 
clauses, with a view to convergence as development 
gaps narrow. Although the precise details must vary 
by development level, all countries need to introduce 
strict limits if not an outright ban on child labour, place 
limits on the normal working day, consider establishing 
a minimum wage or income, implement protection 
for unions and promote collective bargaining, and set 
minimum occupational safety and hygiene standards, 
among other measures.
Second, in a globalized world whose economies 
are increasingly intertwined and thus subject to 
the vagaries of  the international economy, it will 
be necessary to design policies to defend workers 
from recessions caused by external shocks. Sound 
macroeconomic policy is obviously the first line of 
defence for employment. This is why it is essential for 
unions to press consistently for countercyclical policies 
with the greatest number of “built-in stabilizers”.
Among the most important of  the stabilizers 
that should be advocated are fiscal policies that vary 
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automatically with the business cycle, i.e., that entail 
saving during times of prosperity so that deficits can 
be run in downturns. The Chilean policy of structural 
balance is exemplary in this respect. It means that 
the public budget is designed so that spending is 
calculated not from the fiscal revenues of the moment, 
but from the revenue that would be obtained if  the 
economy continued to grow at its trend rate and the 
price of copper (a key export) were at its long-term 
average. This means that the exchequer saves and 
generates a surplus during upturns when the copper 
price is high, allowing it to spend more than it takes 
in during downturns when the economy is growing 
below potential and the copper price is below its long-
term value. The outcome of this policy is that public 
spending is neutral to the cycle, unlike that of many 
countries where it reinforces the cycle. It is because 
of this policy that the current international crisis has 
had less of a recessionary impact and produced fewer 
after-effects in Chile than the Asian crisis.
A third recommendation that should be pressed for 
is the design of policies to help minimize lay-offs when 
recession cannot be avoided. In recessionary situations, 
when sales and thus output fall, employment needs 
to be cut back. What unions are advised to propose 
is that, in such situations, the authorities encourage 
firms to reduce the working day, by 10% say, rather 
than dismissing 10% of their staff.21 Harsh though 
this may be, anyone can adjust to earning 10% less, 
but no-one can adjust to earning 100% less, which is 
what unemployment means. Consequently, in situations 
declared recessionary by the competent authority, it is 
socially preferable for firms to scale back their labour 
requirements through across-the-board reductions 
in the working day rather than through dismissals. 
Interestingly, a number of OECD countries have adopted 
measures of this nature during the recent international 
crisis, so that although Germany, for example, has 
suffered a more severe recession than the United 
States, unemployment has risen by much less there. 
21 This encouragement can simply take the form of making provision 
for firms to be allowed to cut working hours (and remuneration 
in proportion) unilaterally in situations declared recessionary by 
a competent authority, without this constituting a breach of the 
employment contract, and providing that workers who consider this 
unfair and resign will receive the compensation due for dismissal. 
The assumption must be that in such situations, when many firms 
are shedding staff, the vast majority of workers will prefer a 10% 
cut in working hours to a 10% cut in staff. This could be induced 
more energetically if  governments also provided a partial subsidy 
(of 50%, for example) for the loss of hours, so that only half  this 
reduction was reflected in the worker’s pay packet.
Advocating legislation to authorize cuts in working 
hours instead of dismissals is, then, another important 
challenge for unions at the national level.
Fourth, unions in the South need to press for the 
introduction of unemployment insurance. This is not 
just a luxury for developed countries but a necessity 
for any country that is subject to economic crises 
in a globalized world. Logically, the sums involved 
will depend on the country’s development level, the 
level of formal employment and the practicalities of 
administration. However, unemployment insurance 
is a critical instrument for unions because, for one 
thing, it sustains the incomes (cushions the losses) 
of  those who most need it, the unemployed. For 
another, by stabilizing the unemployed’s income it 
lessens the downward pressure on the earnings of 
those in work.
Fifth, productive employment depends critically 
on workforce education and training. This is why 
the key demand of unions is that all young people 
entering the workforce must have a proper trade; they 
should not start work without one, as now happens 
with most of  those who enter the labour market 
after graduating from or dropping out of secondary 
education. Furthermore, continuous productivity 
improvements can only be achieved with a workforce 
that is continually upgrading its skills. This means it 
is important to ensure that all workers are guaranteed 
opportunities for regular training throughout their 
working lives if  they so desire.
This means advocating, first, that all young 
people who drop out of or graduate from secondary 
education but do not go into higher education receive 
a credit entitling them to a good-quality higher 
technical education (usually lasting two years). 
Otherwise young people without a proper trade will 
be condemned to low-productivity work throughout 
their active lives. Ensuring they have the opportunity 
to acquire a proper trade means they will be able to 
earn a wage that places them in the country’s middle 
class (reducing the worst inequalities characteristic of 
developing countries) and gives them upward mobility 
during their career. Such a measure is affordable 
for most developing countries, at least those in the 
middle-income bracket, and returns are so high that 
it will pay for itself  many times over.22
22  The cost of a good higher-level technical education is estimated 
at US$ 4,000 (US$ 2,000 a year over two years) in a country at 
an intermediate stage of development, such as Chile. Assuming 
two thirds of  young people do not go into higher education, 
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Another measure to be advocated is an entitlement 
for all workers to follow training courses for 1% of 
their working lives (which would means five months’ 
training over a working life of 45 years instead of 
the one or two months the average workers currently 
receives in the region), with a view to accelerating 
growth in workers’ productivity and thus their wages 
over the course of their careers. The only condition 
would be for training to be provided in an institution 
of accredited quality and preferably in areas and types 
of work deemed of high priority by the authorities.
Sixth, minimum wage policies (whose cost is 
absorbed by firms) should be reconsidered to see 
whether it is not preferable for unions to press for a 
guaranteed minimum income (at least part of whose 
cost would be absorbed by the exchequer). In closed 
economies, the cost of a higher minimum wage could 
be passed on to consumers without any extra outlay 
by the firm, so that the effect of a higher minimum 
wage on unemployment was small. In open economies, 
on the other hand, a higher minimum wage cannot 
be passed on to consumers, meaning that firms have 
to absorb any increases in this minimum that are 
not offset by productivity gains, so that higher pay 
considered socially necessary could have potentially 
negative consequences for employment.
A minimum income higher than the minimum 
wage can be introduced without negative consequences 
for employment if  the difference between the wage 
earned and the minimum income deemed to be the 
acceptable baseline is absorbed by the exchequer in 
the form of a subsidy for low earners, rather than 
by the firm. In this case, the worker will receive what 
is deemed to be the acceptable baseline income but 
the cost to the firm will not rise, so that there is no 
incentive to avoid employing people. Of course, this 
entails a fiscal cost that will be absorbed by the whole 
of society, or by all firms. Since it is independent of the 
level of employment, however, it will not discourage 
this in the way a minimum wage can do.
c) Within firms
Negotiating the most appropriate employment 
conditions within the so-called range of “legitimate 
indeterminacy” for wage levels has traditionally 
this would imply a cost of some 0.5% of GDP for a country with 
per capita GDP of  US$ 10,000 at purchasing power parity (PPP) 
in the event that funding was by non-reimbursable credits, i.e., 
outright grants. The cost would obviously be much less if  credits 
were partially reimbursable on the basis of how well the recipient 
scored at graduation (which would encourage everyone to strive 
harder to learn their trade).
been a function of unions and will continue to be 
in the future. As was explained earlier, this range is 
the 5% or 10% by which the specific productivity of 
workers in a particular firm may exceed (or fall short 
of) the individual productivity of those workers in 
other firms.
Besides this function, globalization has meant that 
in more open economies it is becoming increasingly 
necessary and desirable to seek forms of negotiation 
that allow firms to compete abroad and collaborate 
internally. One of the most interesting proposals here 
is for the negotiation of “profit-sharing wages”.23 
Current pay systems tend to operate on the basis of 
a set wage for a fixed length of time. In recessions, 
consequently, firms have an incentive to dismiss 
workers, as the obligation to pay the fixed wages agreed 
upon prevents them from lowering their costs. When 
a large portion of workers’ earnings are variable, on 
the other hand (an agreed percentage of sales, or of 
the value of output, or the value added of the firm, or 
profits), companies will be more willing to cut prices in 
recessions because the variable wage component will 
also fall to some extent, and they will consequently 
tend to maintain output and employment. During 
upturns, conversely, the variable component of 
workers’ earnings automatically rises and they share 
in the firm’s prosperity.
Accordingly, profit-sharing wages have the 
attractive effects of minimizing loss of output and 
employment in hard times and improving income 
distribution (relative to what it would otherwise have 
been) during upturns. This is not just theoretical.24 
Profit-sharing wages are widely paid in Japan, with a 
variable component of some 25% of total earnings. 
As a result, Japanese unemployment never rose above 
5.5% even in the recession and long stagnation of 
the late 1990s.
A further virtue of profit-sharing wages is that, 
by linking the earnings of workers as a group more 
closely to the performance of the firm, they induce 
greater effort and higher productivity. This form of 
remuneration, indeed, promotes greater collaboration 
within the firm and is a better defence against the 
vagaries of  the international economy. A recent 
23 This policy, described below, was proposed and popularized 
by Weitzman (1984).
24 See Weitzman and Kruse (1989). Marinakis (1999) has an 
interesting analysis of the problems involved in operating different 
profit-sharing systems in Latin America. He concludes that when 
these systems are the result of collective bargaining rather than 
legally imposed, they are an important instrument for improving 
both labour relations and competitiveness.
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publication concludes that “a system of remuneration 
of this type [profit-sharing], when properly thought 
out, properly explained and implemented honestly 
and transparently, is unquestionably one of the most 
powerful management tools available to any SME” 
(Berg, 2007).
While there has been some reluctance to adopt 
it,25 there has been a trend towards the introduction 
of  remuneration of  this kind. Consequently, it is 
reasonable to propose that unions should press for 
future increases in their members’ earnings to take this 
form rather than that of higher fixed wages alone.
25 For one thing, workers are risk-averse, which makes them prefer 
fixed wages to variable ones. This does not reduce risk, however, 
but swaps one type of risk for another. A set wage means a higher 
risk of unemployment, while profit-sharing wages produce greater 
income fluctuations in return for a lower risk of unemployment. 
Workers may also mistrust the link between the variable component 
and profits, which are so easy to “massage”. Consequently, it is 
important to link the variable component to some parameter that is 
related to profits but is easier to verify, such as sales or output.
V
Conclusion
Looking beyond temporary ups and downs that may 
cause globalization to retreat (the recent international 
crisis, for example) or to advance more quickly, it 
seems clear that it is here to stay. Furthermore, the 
long-term trend is likely to be towards yet further 
integration of the world’s economies. It is important, 
however, that current asymmetries be reduced.
While international trade flows have increased the 
most so far, it is important for the unions of the South 
that capital flows and technology transfers between 
countries should accelerate, as these have an essential 
role to play in raising the low productivity levels of the 
South, and thus in providing opportunities for decently 
paid work. As far as the supply of labour is concerned, 
today’s low levels of migration show globalization at 
its weakest. As the 2009 Human Development Report 
suggests, significantly increasing such flows, particularly 
of unskilled labour, would have a decisive effect in 
alleviating the relative abundance of labour in the 
South which, with a handful of exceptions (mining 
and the public sector), considerably constrains the 
bargaining power of unions there.
Globalization is not just affecting unions, however, 
but is providing them with new opportunities for 
action, some of which have been highlighted in this 
article. Unions have a long history and will continue 
to play an important role in the future regardless of 
the speed of globalization, particularly if  they focus 
on roles like those indicated here, which are coming 
increasingly to the fore with globalization.
(Original: Spanish)
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